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In Medio Stat Virtus: An Alternative View of
Usury in Adam Smith’s Thinking
Maria Pia Paganelli

Some speciﬁc positions of Adam Smith have been, and still are, sources
of problems and debates. Generally, the controversies concern apparent
contradictions in the Smithian theory. An example of these puzzling contradictions in Smith is his position on usury laws:
In countries where interest is permitted, the law, in order to prevent
the extortion of usury, generally ﬁxes the highest rate which can be
taken without incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above the lowest market price, or the price which is commonly
paid for the use of money by those who can give the most undoubted
security. (WN, II.iv.14)
How could a believer in the beauty and power of the market favor
usury laws?
Modern literature tries to answer this question in at least three fashions: a “nonsense” interpretation, a “Keynes-like” interpretation, and a
“Stiglitz and Weiss–like” interpretation. I will argue that these interpretations of Smith on usury laws are unsatisfactory because they neglect
Correspondence may be addressed to Maria Pia Paganelli, Department of Economics, Yeshiva
University, 500 W. 185th Street, New York, NY 10033; e-mail: paganell@ymail.yu.edu. I thank
Tyler Cowen for his inestimable help, advice, and support. I am grateful for the inspiration and
encouragement received from David Levy, and for the comments of two anonymous referees.
The remaining mistakes are mine. In this article, references to The Wealth of Nations are given
as “WN,” followed by the book, chapter, section (when applicable), and paragraph numbers;
references to The Theory of Moral Sentiments are given by “TMS,” followed by the part, section,
chapter, and paragraph numbers.
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Smith’s contextual knowledge.1 I will show how the key to understanding the consistency of Smith’s position on usury can be found in the difference between his contextual knowledge and ours.2
Unlike most modern economists, Smith is a moral philosopher. Smith
has a well-developed classical and, I would argue, consistent view of
the world. In general, for the classical Greeks and Romans, extremes are
dangerous because they are too far away to be seen and known. A middle position is therefore preferred to an “extreme” position. Moreover,
differently from modern economics, which assumes that information is
unbiased and behavior is error-free,3 Smith’s economics observes and
analyzes systematic biased information that leads to systematic errors.
By acknowledging systematic bias and preferring a middle position, it is
possible to make sense of Smith’s position on usury.
Evidence that understanding Smith’s defense of usury laws requires
the tools of moral philosophy and systematic biases can be found in the
extensive use of these two instruments in The Wealth of Nations and
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as in the interaction between
Smith and his most famous intellectual adversary on usury—Jeremy
Bentham.
To show how usury laws make sense in Smith’s world, but not in
Smith’s world seen through some modern lenses, I will consider the possibility of reaching Smith both “from the past” and “from the future.”
Reaching Smith’s position on usury laws from the past is my present attempt. Trying to reach Smith from the future is what current literature
on Smith and usury laws has unsuccessfully tried.
Reaching Smith’s Position on Usury with
the Instruments Available in His Day
Before being the father of economics, Adam Smith was a professor of
moral philosophy. I will therefore look into the “toolbox” of moral philosophy to ﬁnd interpretative instruments.
1. On the difference between a modern-looking “rational reconstruction” and a historical
analysis more respectful of the original context of an author (“historical reconstruction”), see
Blaug 2001. For recent works on Smith that take into account his historical and intellectual
context, see Tribe 1999, Evensky 1998, Evensky 2001, and Young 1997.
2. My interest is strictly to analyze Smith’s consistency as a thinker, regardless of whether
his theories are correct or not.
3. A major attempt to recognize the existence of bias and incorporating biased behavior in
economic analysis can be found in Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and in Kahneman, Slovic, and
Tversky 1982.
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Smith lived during the transition from the ancien régime to modernity.
The principles (economic and otherwise) to which Smith subscribed coincide with some principles that are still recognized today, but Smith’s
understanding of economics was informed by his knowledge of Greek
and Roman literature (see Paganelli 2000 and Griswold 1999). So, while
Smith rejects a theological justiﬁcation of usury laws, which was proposed by many before him,4 he also does not embrace a more amoral
rationality, which some of his contemporaries of less classical education
more likely held.5 As I will show below, Smith’s justiﬁcation of usury
laws was nonreligious (in contrast with most of his predecessors) but
rested on a moral base (in contrast with most of his contemporaries and
successors).
The Classical Medietas
In the eighteenth century, moral philosophy was still heavily based on
the works of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Smith gives us evidence
in all his works of his deep knowledge of the classics.
The Greeks taught Smith that the good, the virtuous, lies within
bounded limits. The Greeks, for instance, lived in a bounded polis. They
expanded by poleis only, creating brand new poleis rather than developing around existing ones. Outside the limits of the polis, Aristotle reminds us, there are only gods or beasts, because what is not bounded is
not human. Inﬁnity, indeed, is nonhuman, dangerous, and paradoxical.
Inﬁnity is not good for humans, because it is not bounded, and therefore not knowable.6 What is knowable is only what can be measured,
and what can be measured has to be bounded. As a consequence, the
“sin” of hubris was the most nefarious and infamous act a person could
commit. Hubris meant challenging the gods; it meant going outside the
limits. The sailors who tried to cross the pillars of Hercules, which were
the borders of the world, died throwing up green bile. What did all this
mean? It meant that extremes were dangerous, that extremes were to be

4. For an overview of the religious justiﬁcation of usury laws, see Nelson 1969.
5. See, for example, Jeremy Bentham’s “Defence of Usury” ([1787] 1952).
6. See, for example, Plato’s considerations of the lack of order associated with inﬁnity in
Philebus (24a-26d), Aristotle’s analysis of the many problems deriving from the idea of inﬁnity
in Physics (III, 5, 204a and following), or the more popular paradox of Zeno’s tortoise, in which
a slow-moving tortoise wins a race against the swift-footed Achilles.
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avoided. It meant that being in the “middle” was the good thing to do.
Greek ethics is a reﬂection of this.
The Greeks were not unique. The Romans developed a similar ethical
system: avoid the extremes and stay in the middle. Virtue is the middle
point between two extremes. It is the balance between opposites. It is
moderation. Choosing to moderate all passions leads one to the “just
middle.” In other words, the way to moral excellence is medietas or
mediocritas (being in the middle).7 It follows that the virtuous man is
the prudent man, the man who has reached an internal balance within
himself, who has his “soul in its just and proper order.” And the social
nature of human beings implied that the virtuous behavior of the individual is possible thanks to conscious choice and his interrelations with
the other individuals in the orderly society.
This concept of medietas (in modern statistical terminology, the median) was the pivot around which revolved not just the classical world
but also the medieval world and the world of the ancien régime.8 Not
by chance, Cicero’s De Ofﬁciis was a major textbook until the nineteenth century. And during the ancien régime, as well as during the classical age, individual virtue and social virtue were strictly related. Virtuous individuals would create a virtuous society, and a society with
virtuous moral rules would give individuals incentives to become virtuous. This interdependence between the medietas of the individual and
of the virtues of the society in which he lived is exempliﬁed, among
others, by oeconomica. Economics, indeed, not as a science in itself
as we know it today, but as an “art,” was presented by Aristotle, and
by the literature of the ancien régime, as the discipline that involves a
“just” government of the house (see Continisio 1994). It was part of
moral philosophy. The governance of the house was different from the
governance of the city or kingdom (civitas) because their domains of
action were different, and both were well circumscribed. But both required the same practical virtue and ability in order to achieve the just,
virtuous, and mediocres order. Indeed, the father of the family, as the
“prince” of his family, was required to be virtuous, to have “economic
7. Medietas and mediocritas are equivalent and will be used interchangeably. I will use the
Latin term, since its translation into “mediocrity” would add a negative connotation that was
absent in the ancient word.
8. See, for example, Bishop Berkeley’s (1975) mathematics and theory of vision which,
read as a scientiﬁc work or as metaphors, express the same distrust for inﬁnity and extremes.
See Levy 1992.
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prudence”: “The practical character of economics . . . , following the traditional Aristotelian canons, puts it among the ‘operative’ disciplines
that, unlike the ‘contemplative’ disciplines, which address the knowledge of things that are necessary, natural, and independent from human
will, address the ‘contingent’ things, which are subject to human will, in
order to guide action toward the just end. The art of good governance of
the house ‘is subjected to prudence, and it is domestic prudence itself’”
(Frigo 1995, 36; my translation).
The Inﬂuence of Medietas on Adam Smith
With this in mind, read Smith’s “advertisement” to the last edition of The
Theory of Moral Sentiments that he edited after writing The Wealth of
Nations:
In the last paragraph of the ﬁrst Edition of the present work, I said,
that I should in another discourse endeavour to give account of the
general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of
society; not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. In the
Enquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as concerns police,
revenue, and arms.
Smith, therefore, regarded The Wealth of Nations as continuing the
sequence of thoughts set out in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It seems
that for Smith, the starting point to understanding The Wealth of Nations
is The Theory of Moral Sentiments.9
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith shows man in all his dimensions, as the classics did. Individuals are characterized by a plurality
of different feelings, both toward themselves and toward others, ranging
from selﬁshness to benevolence. It is explicitly in part 7 of The Theory
of Moral Sentiments where, dealing with moral philosophy as a system,
Smith criticizes some then-modern interpretations of ethics as presenting human behavior as motivated by only one thing, and he leaves little
doubt about his borrowing from classical thought the idea of virtue as
medietas between opposing extremes. And it is not by chance that Smith
9. For a recent survey of das Adam Smith Problem, see Peters-Fransen 2000.
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focuses on a variety of different passions, contrasting himself with some
of his contemporaries, teachers, and friends. Indeed, if there were just
one motivation for our behavior, where would virtue be? If there were
just one extreme, where would the “just middle” of opposed passions be?
To have a point in the middle, at least two extremes, and not just one,
have to exist. Indeed, at the practical and individual level, a completed
and developed human being, with the help of the impartial spectator, has
to balance all his feelings, and by achieving such a balance, he will be
virtuous. At the abstract and in a sense aggregate level, a completed and
developed moral system has to include all feelings too, and virtue will
consist in the proper, just, balanced combination of them.
Remember that from what Smith told us in the advertisement of his
last edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, his project was a large
one. With The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he built a moral structure for
human beings. With The Wealth of Nations Smith analyzed how the same
man full of different passions would set in a “police, revenue, and arms”
context. The same individual passions can be ampliﬁed or restrained in
different proportions by different sets of political and economic institutions. The “prudent man” described in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
is essentially the same person assumed to be at work in the commercial
society described in The Wealth of Nations. Indeed, if it is true that in
The Wealth of Nations the predominant presence is self-love, it is also
true that it is never the only one (Bittermann 1940a, 1940b).
Smith was conscious, though, that virtue is not easy to achieve, that
people are imperfect, and not perfectible. At the same time, Smith was
conscious that absolute principles may not always be appropriate, and
that a contextual analysis may offer a more appropriate basis for judgment. So, for example, sympathy is good, but not always strong; selfinterest is good, but not on all occasions; and a limited presence of government is also good, but not necessarily all the time.
More speciﬁcally, self-interest tends to prevail over sympathy in the
context of market transactions. First of all, we do not get our dinner
“from the benevolence of the butcher”—instead, self-interest prevails.
Moreover, sympathy, which usually can constrain self-interest, tends to
decrease the less we know about another person. But when dealing with
strangers, competition and repeated dealings offer “natural” restraints
to an otherwise prevalent selﬁshness, and trade is able to channel in
a positive manner one’s self-interest (WN, I.ii.2). The market, here, is
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able to bound human passions, keeping them balanced, preventing them
from falling into vicious extremes. The presence of self-interest is seen,
in this context, in a positive light—and as maintaining social harmony.
When, instead, we are faced with an institutional context in which selfinterest is left unbounded, self-interest assumes a negative connotation.
Unbounded self-interest can become “rapacity,” according to Smith. It
is indeed self-interest that, breaking its bounds, ﬂatters government in
order to achieve monopolistic privileges, abandoning free trade. Engaging in unbounded selﬁsh possibilities and acquiring an “artiﬁcially” predominant role through government-granted monopolies breaks the natural harmony of society by damaging the whole in favor of a small part
(WN, I.xi). Virtue is medietas; if one extreme prevails and the just middle is abandoned, the consequences cannot be positive. The dominance
of self-interest, sustained by the force of government, not only moves
the individual away from virtue, but also society away from harmony.
Similarly, Smith is ready to accept both the goodness of the absence
and of the presence of government in society, depending on the speciﬁc context. If sympathy is weak, if the impartial spectator makes a
mistake, if man cannot perceive well, a free market is preferred. But
when, for whatever reasons, the free market fails, government intervention can do good.10 An example of this positive role for government intervention is Smith’s controversial position on public schools (controversial only if seen out of context). Smith noted that if specialization, as
self-interest, is present in the “proper quantity,” if it is balanced with
other individuals’ activities in the proper proportion (that depends on
the speciﬁc institutional and historical context), its role is positive. Specialization can do wonders at the individual and societal level. But if
disproportional with respect to the “proper level,” the consequences are
negative, both at the individual and at the societal level (WN, V.i.f.50).
How to maintain specialization in the “proper measure”? Smith provided
us an antidote. Education and religion are indeed the instruments that,
if promoted among the workers, can keep alive their mind and rebalance their selves (WN, V.i.f). And if the market fails to provide schools,
government is welcome to intervene, so that the just and good medietas can be maintained both at the individual level as well as at the
social level.
10. On the active role of government in Smith, see Jacob Viner’s 1927 essay “Adam Smith
and Laissez-Faire” reprinted in Viner 1991.
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This being the case, Henry Bittermann (1940a, 516) is correct in saying, “Paradoxical as it may seem, the theory of ethics was less directly
normative than the scientiﬁc work on economics. The moral theory was
in the main descriptive; the economic theory neatly wove prescriptive
elements into its descriptive-predictive fabric.”
It follows, also, that David Levy (1987) is correct in saying that legal
restraints in the economy (and not only there) work like a sort of moral
code in Smith’s framework.11
The Inﬂuence of Systematic Error on Adam Smith
How can sympathy be weak? the impartial spectator make a mistake?
man not perceive well? and the market fail? All these problems can be
related to systematic biases.
An example of weak sympathy is experienced the farther away (literally and ﬁguratively) people are from each other. If this is the only
problem, the market will usually take care of it. But more problems may
come when accompanied by other defects.
As human beings have to learn how to perceive distances, human beings have to learn how to sympathize. Sympathy is the natural component of human beings that allows the existence of the impartial spectator. But the spectator who is in us since birth is “partial” (Levy 1995).
This implies that the Smithian man is born with a strong egocentrism.
By interacting with others, the individual realizes that he is not “the center of the universe,” as he thought. Through his relationships with others, by imagining himself in somebody else’s shoes, the individual grows
morally and slowly transforms his internal spectator from partial to impartial.
The impartial spectator is therefore the fruit of a continuous interior
work, helped by the presence of others, which leads the morality of the
individual to maturity. The full maturity of the individual, his full morality, cannot be taken for granted. Virtue is a conquest, not a given.

11. “Smith’s opinion that government ofﬁcials have no role to play in the direction of private resources does not imply that law has no role. While Smith knew the notion of ‘government
failure’ as well as modern public-choice theorists, legal restraints in Smith’s work have an interesting similarity to moral codes. When people are not fully aware of the consequences of
their action, both can provide beneﬁts to the constrained individual. . . . In this case, where law
can improve social well-being, Smith favors it” (Levy 1987, 399–400).
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What about the possibility that human beings will make mistakes because of systematic bias? Smith opens both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations by describing exactly this possibility.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments begins with descriptions of how
we constantly make mistakes because we imagine ourselves in someone else’s condition and keep reasoning with our own mind, not theirs.
So we feel sorry for the dead because they are alone and cold under the
ground, while they, being dead, cannot feel anything. We feel sorry for
the mentally insane, “but the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings
perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery” (TMS, I.i.11).
And so on . . .
The Wealth of Nations opens with the famous misperception:
[The division of labor] is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in
some very triﬂing [manufacturing operations]. . . . In those great manufactures, on the contrary, . . . the work may really be divided into a
much greater number of parts, than in those of a more triﬂing nature,
[although] the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly
been much less observed. (WN, I.i.2)
Systematic errors in perception turn out to be the norm. The implication is therefore that the starting point, the assumption (which in Smith’s
case is empirical observation), from which Smith starts to work, is perception errors that lead to systematic errors. And in the presence of systematic errors social harmony may have some troubles. One of these
troubles is indeed with respect to the interest rate.
Even chapter 4 of book 2, “On Stock Lent at Interest,” opens with the
description of a common error in perception. There are two kinds of borrowers, says Smith: the industrious borrower and the prodigal borrower.
The industrious borrower will borrow capital to use it in a proﬁtable way;
he will be able to pay back the lender. The prodigal borrower will borrow
for immediate consumption and “will soon be ruined, and he who lends
to him will generally have occasion to repent of his folly” (WN, II.iv.2).
Many think that the proportion of the two kinds of borrowers is either
equal or skewed toward the prodigal, but this cannot be the case. To verify that this is a biased perception, ask a rich lender: he will laugh at the
idea of lending to the prodigal: “From the regard that all men have for
their own interest, we may be assured, that it cannot happen [to lend to
both the industrious and the prodigal] so very frequently as we are sometimes apt to imagine. Ask any rich man of common prudence, to which
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of the two sort of people he has lent the greater part of his stock, to those
who, he thinks, will employ it proﬁtably, or to those who will spend it
idly, and he will laugh at you for proposing the question” (WN, II.iv.2).
Making Sense of Smith on Usury
Now that we are equipped with Smith’s analytical instruments—medietas and systematic perception error—we can try to understand why
Smith favors usury laws.
Smith is saying that the interest rate should be regulated by law, and
ﬁxed “somewhat above the lowest market price” (WN, II.iv.14). The
other two rates he considers are no rate at all (“prohibition of interest”)
and “usury.” Note what we have: two extremes and a middle position.
Prohibition is the lower extreme, usury is the upper extreme, and the legal rate is the middle point.
Smith as a moral philosopher teaches us that the extremes are dangerous and should be avoided. Smith as an economist says that both prohibition of interest and usury rates are deleterious and should be avoided.
Here is how Smith describes the consequences of prohibiting interest:
In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law.
But as something can every-where be made by the use of money,
something ought every-where to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury; the debtor being obliged to pay, not only for
the use of money, but for the risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use. He is obliged, if one may say so, to
insure his creditor from the penalties of usury. (WN, II.iv.13)
Indeed, “no law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest
ordinary market rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of 1766, by which the French king attempted to reduce the
rate of interest from ﬁve to four per cent., money continued to be lent in
France at ﬁve per cent., the law being evaded in several different ways”
(WN, II.iv.16).
And here is how he describes the consequences of usury:
The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat
above, ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal
rate of interest in Great Britain, for example, was ﬁxed so high as eight
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or ten per cent., the greater part of the money which was to be lent,
would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing
to give this high interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of
money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use
of it, would not venture into the competition. A great part of the capital
of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most
likely to make a proﬁtable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into
those which were most likely to waste and destroy it. (WN, II.iv.15)
What Smith is describing in this passage is adverse selection. Given
the presence of heterogeneous borrowers—prodigals and projectors as
well as sober people—the higher the interest rate, the riskier the projects
(the ones by prodigals and projectors) that will be ﬁnanced, leaving out
more sober entrepreneurs.
Now, consider Smith’s analysis on risk premium: lending money gives
the lender a higher return than investing in land, which is more stable. “The superior security of land, together with some other advantages
which almost every-where attend upon this species of property, will generally dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from land,
than what he might have by lending out his money at interest” (WN,
II.iv.17).
Indeed, high interest rates as well as rates of proﬁts are present when
there is high risk. And the riskier the project, the higher the risk premium
will be. Smith has already exposed this fact in book 1 of The Wealth of
Nations, in chapter 10, part 1, titled “Inequalities Arising from the Nature
of the Employments Themselves.” In paragraph 33, Smith states:
The ordinary rate of proﬁt always rises more or less with the risk. It
does not, however, seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as to compensate it completely. Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous trades. The most hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler,
though when the adventure succeeds it is likewise the most proﬁtable,
is the infallible road to bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so
many adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their competition
reduces the proﬁt below what is sufﬁcient to compensate the risk. To
compensate it completely, the common returns ought, over and above
the ordinary proﬁts of stock, not only to make up for all the occasional losses, but to afford a surplus proﬁt to the adventurers of the
same nature with the proﬁt of insurers. But if the common returns
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were sufﬁcient for all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent
in these than in other trades. (WN, I.x.b.33)
Smith is therefore saying that prohibition of interest causes usury, and
usury rates are harmful to the individual and to the economy because of
the problems described above. A middle position is therefore preferred
to the extreme positions. But why would interest rates rise to extreme
levels? Why should the “just middle” be legally enforced?
Smith leads us to the answer when talking about the problems caused
by high rates. People are attracted by the high proﬁt of a risky project,
but the more projectors, the lower the proﬁt will be. Many will get bankrupted. And so the question: If this is known, why do they not stay out
of that activity? Why do they engage in such projects? Smith’s answer:
systematic bias. It is “the presumptuous hope of success [that] seems
to act here as upon all other occasions” (WN, I.x.b.33; emphasis added)
that causes miscalculation of the probability of success. The projector,
like the gambler, is facing a lottery-like situation. He is biased; he thinks
he is “the center of the universe”; he thinks others will fail, but not him.
He will therefore overestimate the probability of his success and underestimate the probability of his failure.
The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of
their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers
and moralists of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good
fortune, has been less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still
more universal. There is no man living who, when in tolerable health
and spirits, has not some share of it. The chance of gain is by every
man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men
under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and
spirits, valued more than it is worth. (WN, I.x.b.26; emphasis added)
Most of the times in which we face a decision under uncertainty, we
are facing a maximization problem with “incorrect” data. The expected
beneﬁt, biased by the projector’s/gambler’s presumption, will exceed the
expected cost of the project/bet. If the information used in his calculation
were not biased, the expected cost would exceed the expected beneﬁt and
he would restrain himself from engaging in such a risky project. But the
information is biased, so the project/bet will be undertaken.
Since people tend to systematically overestimate their probability of
success, there is the tendency for interest rates to be higher than the
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market-clearing level. The overestimated interest rate leads to the problems of adverse selection, ﬁnancing too many overly risky projects. A
ceiling is therefore important to prevent the degenerative consequences
of this process.
Conﬁrmation of this reading of Smith comes from his adversary in the
usury debate. Jeremy Bentham recognizes Smith’s argument on systematic bias, and turns it against Smith: if there is a bias on the borrower’s
side, there is also another bias, which goes in the opposite direction, as
far as the lender is concerned. Even if the projector has a tendency to
overestimate his probability of success, it is likely that the lender will
underestimate it. The problem caused by the projector’s bias is solved
by the (opposite) lender’s bias. These two opposite biases cancel each
other out, making usury laws unnecessary.
True it is, that in the jumble of occurrences, an over-sanguine projector may stumble upon a patron as over-sanguine as himself; and the
wishes may bribe the judgment of the one, as they did of the other. The
opposite case, however, you will allow, I think to be by much the more
natural. Whatever a man’s wishes may be for the success of an enterprize not yet his own, his fears are likely to be still stronger. That same
pretty generally implanted principle of vanity and self-conceit, which
disposes most of us to over-value each of us his own conceptions, disposes us, in a proportional degree, to under-value those of other men.
(Bentham [1787] 1952, 181)
To further corroborate this reading of Smith, Bentham is explicit in
the need to relate the usury problem to the lottery problem, where Smith
openly presents his theory of systematic bias. And while Bentham also
recognizes the “lottery problem” in projects, he disagrees with Smith on
the consequences. Bentham, differently from Smith, sees the “inventionlottery” not as what today we would call a negative externality, but as,
in today’s words, a positive externality.
Consider, Sir, that it is not with the invention-lottery (that great
branch of the project-lottery, for the sake of which I am defending
the whole, and must continue so to do until you or somebody else
can shew me how to defend it on better terms). It is not I say with
the invention-lottery, as with the mine lottery, the privateering-lottery,
and so many other lotteries, which you speak of, and in no instance, I
think, very much to their advantage. In these lines, success does not,
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as in this, arise out of embers of ill success, and thence propagate itself, by a happy contagion, perhaps to all eternity. (Bentham [1787]
1952, 182)
The problem of negative externality related to lotteries is picked up
by David Levy (1987, 388), who, commenting on Smith’s problem with
gambling due to misperception, says, “So what? People, in the eyes of
moralists of all parties, have always appeared foolish. If people are willing to pay for the pleasure of gambling or they fail to compute the correct
odds of the gamble, aren’t they bearing the consequences themselves? In
Smith’s account, this they are not. When investors gamble, they bet society’s resources.”
Actually, by betting society’s resources, as also Joseph Jadlow (1977)
shows, they are also preventing others from making productive and safer
investments. But while Jadlow and Levy claim different risk preferences,
Smith claims that since we are not calculating with “true” values, we can,
without realizing it, create externalities, because we may be maximizing
our utility and at the same time turning our bill to someone else.
It is important to notice that Smith is aware of the difﬁculties of picking the “correct” legal ceiling. It is a difﬁcult task for everybody, including government ofﬁcials (WN, II.iv.14).
Smith seems willing to impose an interest rate by law, incurring the
risk that the interest imposed is not the correct one, because individual
virtue and social virtue are interdependent. When individuals are virtuous, society, as a reﬂection, is virtuous as well. When society is governed
by mediocres virtuous rules, individuals have more incentive to be virtuous. In other words, since laws are general rules, laws are required,
because the way to overcome systematic biases, at the individual as well
as at the social level, is to rely on general (moral) rules.
To see the importance of general moral rules in dealing with systematic biases we have to rely, again, on the base of The Wealth of Nations,
which is to say, on The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
This is what Smith has to say about “the nature of self-deceit, and of
the origin and use of general rules” (TMS, III.4):
There are two different occasions upon which we examine our own
conduct, and endeavour to view it in the light in which the impartial
spectator would view it: ﬁrst, when we are about to act; and secondly,
after we have acted. Our views are apt to be very partial in both cases;
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but they are apt to be most partial when it is of most importance that
they should be otherwise. (TMS, III.4.2)
Smith therefore claims that we judge our actions in a biased fashion,
both before and after the action, since “every thing appears magniﬁed
and misrepresented by self-love” (TMS, III.4.3). Indeed, “it is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposely turn away
our view from those circumstances which might render that judgment
unfavourable” (TMS, III.4.4).
These biases have disastrous consequences, especially because they
undermine social harmony. The way to maintain the “proper and just
order,” which is to say the way to maintain the virtuous order of society, is to follow “general rules.” These general rules are moral and help
the moral development of the individual as well as the orderly life of
society.
This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of
half the disorders of human life. . . .
Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of so much
importance, altogether without a remedy; nor has she abandoned us
entirely to the delusions of self-love. Our continual observations upon
the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain
general rules concerning what is ﬁt and proper either to be done or to
be avoided. . . .
It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. . . .
Those general rules of conduct, when they have been ﬁxed in our
mind by habitual reﬂection, are of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is ﬁt and proper to be done
in our particular situation. (TMS, III.4.6–8, 12)
As mentioned above, in the ancien régime, the individual and society
are strictly interrelated. The virtues or the vices of the individual are reﬂected in, and are a reﬂection of, the virtues and vices of his society.12
The rules for individual virtue are the rules for a good social order. And
“in medio stat virtus” (“virtue is in the middle,” which is to say,
medietas) is one of the most general rules to reach virtue and social
harmony.
12. Bernard Mandeville distances himself in a revolutionary fashion from this position, by
contrasting individual and social vices and virtues. Not by chance, Smith attacks and criticizes
Mandeville openly and at length in TMS, VII.ii.4.
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Smith’s favor for usury laws and the free market are consistent with
each other when we consider “stay in the just middle” as the most general rule to follow in order to achieve individual virtue as well as social
harmony. Markets are, most of the time, able to achieve medietas without any external help. Interest rates instead are not able to achieve such
results. Individuals are unfortunately but inevitably characterized by systematic perception biases. They systematically tend to overestimate the
probability of winning in the “project-lottery.” By leaving the situation
unregulated, extremely high usury rates would arise. The traditional solution to this usury problem was extreme also: abolish the interest rate
in toto. Therefore we would fall in one of either two opposite extremes,
both dangerous. One extreme would be usury, the deleterious effect of
which would lead to adverse selection, as shown above. The second extreme would be the abolition of the interest rate, which brings consequences as deleterious as its opposite extreme.
Moral philosophy teaches us that the dangers of extremes can be overcome by following a general virtuous rule, which would lead to the “just
and proper order”: avoid the extremes, stay in the middle. In the case
of the interest rate, the middle position would be a moderately positive
rate of interest. Indeed, Smith proposes a legal maximum interest rate
slightly above the market rate, which is more than zero and less than the
usury levels. The rate should be “legal” because our systematic mistakes
of perception would lead us to slide toward the upper extreme.
Reaching Smith’s Position on Usury from
Modern Mainstream Analysis
Part of modern economics is unable to reconcile Smith’s justiﬁcations
for usury laws with other positions held by Smith. This inability stems
from the fact that modern economists insist on using their own instruments, rather than Smith’s. When modern economists attempt to see the
consistency in Smith by analyzing his conclusions, they end up using
faulty reasoning; when they attempt to see the consistency by focusing
on his analysis, they fail to reach the same conclusion as Smith.
I view at least three major ways of analyzing the consistency of Smith
on usury laws in today’s literature. One path of analysis, even if not
necessarily following Smith’s analysis, agrees with or justiﬁes Smith’s
support for usury laws (what I call the “Keynes-like” interpretation). Another modern line of thought follows Smith’s analysis closely but reaches
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opposite policy conclusions (what I call the “Stiglitz and Weiss–like” interpretation). In order to maintain my argument within tractable limits,
I will present only a couple of scholars who can be located in each interpretative framework. The third line of analysis feeds on das Adam
Smith Problem and cannot make any sense of Smith’s position on usury,
accusing Smith of radical inconsistency or of superﬁcial analysis (see
for example Robbins 1968 and Stigler 1975). Given my interpretation
of Smith, das Adam Smith Problem does not arise. I will therefore dismiss this failed attempt to understand Smith and, to avoid redundancy, I
will not comment on it.
The Keynes-Like Interpretation
In what I call the Keynes-like interpretation I bundle together scholars
who are not necessarily Keynesian, but who interpret Smith’s support of
usury laws in terms of growth, similarly to Keynes. I consider three examples of analysis within this framework. In the ﬁrst example, Smith’s
support for usury laws is seen as a way to encourage investment in lowrisk sectors of the economy, stimulating growth. The second example
answers Bentham’s criticism, that usury laws impede the ﬁnancing of
entrepreneurial activities, retarding innovation and growth. In the third
example, usury laws are viewed as a weapon against rent-seeking, which
otherwise would bring a country to stagnation. For each of these examples, the modern argument is presented ﬁrst, followed by some of the
reasons why that argument fails to ﬁnd consistency in Smith’s thought.
I name this line of interpretation “Keynes-like” since Keynes aligns
himself on Smith’s side of the barricade, supporting usury laws.
Keynes ([1936] 1997, 351) wrote, “The rate of interest is not selfadjusting at a level best suited to the social advantage but constantly
tends to rise too high, so that a wise Government is concerned to curb
it by statute and custom and even by invoking the sanction of the moral
law.” Keynes favors usury laws because he thinks that they will stimulate
economic growth by increasing investment. Income would increase as a
consequence of the increased investment. But it has been noticed that
Keynes does not offer any further speciﬁcation (Blitz and Long 1965).
A ﬁrst example of reasoning in the Keynes-like framework is by Levy
(1987). Levy believes Smith favors usury laws because usury laws will
discourage investment in risky sectors of the economy, like international
trade, and will encourage investment in the safer sectors instead, such as
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agriculture. According to Levy, for Smith usury laws promote economic
growth and therefore should be supported.13 But Levy’s reading raises at
least three problems, the most serious of which is that Smith’s support
for free trade becomes an unexplainable counterexample.
First of all, although Levy interprets Smith as saying that agriculture
is the key to growth and that agriculture should be preferred to foreign
trade, he also sees Smith as putting strong limitations on this statement.
Levy noted that Smith also said agriculture is only the ﬁrst stage of economic development. Indeed, developed countries increasingly depend
on industry, specialization, and trade. But, if usury laws are useful because they support agriculture, and if agriculture is only the ﬁrst stage of
economic development, the implication would be that usury laws should
be enforced only during the early stages of the economic development
of a country. When a country reaches more advanced stages of economic
development, the laws should be abolished. But this is not what Smith
said. Second, in order to accept Levy’s argument, it has to be proven that
savings generated in the safe agricultural sector will move to the riskier
foreign trade. If instead in rural society savings tend to be reinvested
in agriculture (Blitz and Long 1965), usury laws would be useless, because they would prevent a transfer of resources (from agriculture to foreign trade) that would never take place anyway. Finally, arguing that for
Smith economic growth heavily depends on domestic agriculture would
leave unexplained why Smith champions free trade. So, for instance, following Levy’s reasoning, Smith’s vigorous support of anti–corn laws,
which favor international trade over domestic agriculture, would be left
unexplained. A modern reading of Smith’s support of usury laws, such as
Levy’s, therefore, does not solve the puzzle of how Smith could support
usury laws and the free market at the same time.
A second example of reading Smith on usury laws in the Keynes-like
framework is Samuel Hollander (1999). Hollander explains why Bentham’s criticisms of Smith’s position on usury laws may be inappropriate, but he does not offer a solid explanation of why Smith favors such
laws, nor of why Smith proposes the speciﬁc maximum legal rate for
England that he does.
13. “Usury laws, in Smith’s opinion, can beneﬁt society by reducing the riskiness of society’s investments. . . . By investing more in agriculture than in foreign trade, there is a net
product which beneﬁts society, but not necessarily the individual making the decision” (Levy
1987, 397). And: “The second determinant of growth is the composition of this productive labor: countries which employ more agricultural labor will grow most rapidly” (Levy 1987, 393).
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Hollander’s analysis of the debate (or the lack thereof) between Bentham and Smith is a defense of Smith against Bentham. Bentham worried that Smith, proposing usury laws, would strangle innovation, investment, and growth. But, explains Hollander, within-family lending
and equity ﬁnancing were the most common way of bankrolling “innovations” during Smith’s time; therefore, in practice, usury laws would
not deter investment, development, and growth, showing that Bentham’s
criticisms of Smith are inaccurate.14 But were this the case, we would be
left without an explanation for why Smith proposes laws against usury,
since usury laws would block an interest rate for a loan that, in practice,
is not requested. Moreover, Hollander himself recognizes that his reading of Smith faces another problem. If Smith’s favor for usury laws is
justiﬁed on practical grounds, the legal rate Smith picked as an example
for England is inexplicable. Smith uses an interest rate that was below
the market rate, rather than “slightly above,” much before the last edition
of The Wealth of Nations. Hollander cannot justify why Smith, having
the time and the opportunity, did not revise the rate upward. On the other
hand, when Smith’s enterprise is analyzed in terms of a (moral) theoretical framework, rather than on a practical base, the attention is concentrated on the general principle—follow a general rule, legal when necessary, that keeps things in the “just middle,” so that individual virtue and
social harmony are achieved and preserved. The exact “practical” rate
becomes, therefore, irrelevant.
Finally, let us analyze a third example of the Keynes-like interpretation of Smith’s reasoning for supporting usury laws. In this reading,
rent-seeking is considered the key for interpreting Smith on usury laws.15
Usury rates are viewed as the result of rent-seeking activities of the rich.
But reading Smith as proposing usury laws against the deleterious rentseeking self-interest “of the rich” raises at least three new problems.
First, Smith seems to have forgotten the distinction he previously made
between lenders (savers) and merchants; second, he would have made,
simultaneously, opposite assumptions on the saving propensity of
human beings; and ﬁnally, he would have proposed policies difﬁcult to
sustain, given his premises.

14. “Smith might, therefore, have defended himself against Bentham’s charges by insisting
that, in practice, his support of the usury laws did not imply that investment—innovatory or
otherwise—would be starved of funding” (Hollander 1999, 537).
15. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for considering this point of view.
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According to this view, Smith, like Keynes after him, believes that
interest rates were kept artiﬁcially high by restrictions in the ﬁnancial
capital market and/or in its access. High interest rates are usually found
in the absence of abundant capital and, vice versa, low interest rates are
present where there is abundant capital (WN, I.ix.20 and II.iv.8, among
the references). But market forces are not always free to work. Human
intervention, via the power of legislation, can interfere and change the
market results: “A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest considerably above what the condition of the country, as to wealth
or poverty would require” (WN, I.ix.16).
The law is “defective,” it is argued, because it is molded by the selﬁsh
demands of the rich. The rich, owning capital, want to maximize their
returns, and they achieve this goal by asking for government protection
so that they can restrict the quantity of capital in the market and seek
higher rents. China is mentioned as a country in which there are “laws
and institutions . . . [that] establish the monopoly of the rich” and where,
as a consequence, the interest rate is “large” (WN, I.ix.15).
Furthermore, Smith aggressively attacks attempts to form cartels or
monopolies, attempts that are motivated by the voracity for proﬁts of
“merchants,” “master manufacturers,” and “dealers”:
The interest of this third order [of those who live by proﬁt], therefore, has not the same connection with the general interest of the society as that of the other two [of those who live by wages from labor
and of those who live off of rent from land]. Merchants and master
manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people who commonly employ the largest capitals. . . . [They know their interest very
well.] The interest of the dealers . . . in any particular branch of trade
or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even
opposite to, that of the publick. (WN, I.xi.p.10)
In this interpretative framework, Smith is claimed to propose usury
laws to limit social abuses caused by these attempts at monopoly/cartel
by those who live by proﬁt.
The pillar of this line of argument is that lenders form a socially
deleterious rent-seeking interest group. But this interpretation cannot account for previous claims of Smith regarding the identity of the lenders
and their role in society. Indeed, arguing that the achievement of the
lenders’ interest is in conﬂict with the social interest implies, as shown
above, that lenders, owning capital, are among those people who live by
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proﬁt, the target of Smith’s attacks. But the group of people that Smith
attacks is composed only of merchants, master manufacturers, and dealers, as Smith speciﬁes. Lenders are not part of this potentially dangerous
group. Lenders are indeed part of a different category of people—the
“monied interest”—which differs from the “trading and manufacturing
interest,” since merchants, master manufacturers, and dealers do not lend
their capital, but rather, they employ their own capital. “As such capitals
are commonly lent out and paid back in money, they constitute what
is called the monied interest. It is distinct, not only from the landed,
but from the trading and manufacturing interests, as in these last the
owners themselves employ their own capitals” (WN, II.iv.5; emphasis
added).
Indeed, according to Smith, lenders are savers (WN, II.iii.4, 13), and
savers of capital are a different group of people from the one that employs or consumes capital.16 And Smith lauds the “frugal man” who
saves (WN, II.iii.19).17 Lenders, being savers, are not an interest group
that harms society. On the contrary, lenders beneﬁt society.
A second set of difﬁculties occurs following this Keynes-like interpretation of Smith’s usury laws. Reading lenders as able to control access
to capital in the market, as proposed above, forming what today we call
a cartel, fails to consider how lenders would hold their cartel in place
over time. The rent-seeking cartel of lenders could stick together either
through no capital growth or through preventing the increasing capital
from affecting interest rates. But both of these solutions are implausible.
In Smith’s framework, indeed, the driving force of capital accumulation
is saving.18 The absence of capital growth, therefore, can be achieved by
assuming that everybody is prodigal, that is, by assuming that there is no
parsimony. If nobody saves, capital cannot grow. But Smith denies this
option.19 Alternatively, consider what happens when the assumption of
16. “What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and nearly
in the same time too; but it is consumed by a different set of people” (WN, II.iii.18; emphasis
added).
17. Smith reproves instead the prodigal man who “tends not only to beggar himself, but to
impoverish his country” (WN, II.iii.20).
18. “Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony accumulates. But whatever industry might
acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater” (WN,
II.iii.16).
19. “But the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition, a
desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and
never leaves us till we go into the grave” (WN, II.iii.28).
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a zero savings rate does not hold. Lenders, driven by their self-interest,
lend to make money. Lenders therefore invest in proﬁtable enterprises
(WN, II.iv.2). The proﬁtable businesses will generate new capital. Part
of the new capital will be reinvested in the same activity and part will
be saved and lent/invested in a different, new proﬁtable activity (WN,
II.iii.4, II.iii.15). With parsimony, therefore, the total quantity of capital
increases. By increasing the quantity of capital, interest rates will spontaneously decrease (e.g., WN, II.iv.8). If there is downward pressure on
interest rates due to the ﬁnancing of successful enterprises and a positive savings rate, and if the lenders are a cartel, the cartel is subject to
competitive pressures that may lead to its disintegration. But if lenders
are self-interested rent-seekers, as assumed above, they can ask for and
achieve protective laws. The logical prediction derived from this reasoning would be that the lenders ask for a price-ﬂoor to prevent the interest
rate from decreasing. This, though, is unheard of.
Furthermore, granting some credit to the possibility of adverse selection as presented by Smith (WN, II.iv.15), we face the problem of a group
of lenders artiﬁcially holding up interest rates, but only to ﬁnance risky
projects with a low probability of being repaid. This seems to contradict
the idea that the “third order” (those who live by proﬁt) knows its interest
(WN, I.xi.p.10).
Finally, the conclusion of this variant of the Keynes-like interpretation is that the source of the problem is “bad laws,” as in China. The
government, which gave in to the ﬂattery “of the rich,” is the source of
the “bad laws” that generated usury rates. Were the “rent-seeking interpretation” of usury laws correct, the government would be left with no
apparent good reason for accepting the implementation of usury laws,
because the powerful rich would seek to maintain their protection rather
than accept its dismantling. Moreover, assuming it were true that usury
rates are caused by rent-seeking laws and ignoring the above objection,
Smith would have avoided many predictable problems by proposing to
abolish those laws, rather than adventuring into such muddy territory
(as recognized by Smith himself in WN, II.iv.14) as ﬁxing interest rate
ceilings. Were this “rent-seeking argument” correct, Smith would leave
us with new problems regarding his consistency, since the government
would simultaneously and inexplicably be the source of the problem as
well as its solution.
A reading with modern instruments is, once again, more problematic
than a reading with old instruments.
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The Stiglitz and Weiss–Like Interpretation
The other modern approach to Smith on usury is to try to follow Smith
step by step in his analysis of the interest rate ceiling and restate it in
more rigorous analytical terms. I call this approach the “Stiglitz and
Weiss–like” interpretation because Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss
(1981) were able to model credit rationing in markets with imperfect information in a way that is strikingly similar to Smith’s analysis, as also
Hollander (1999) recognizes. Stiglitz and Weiss, as well as Smith, show
the existence of non-market-clearing equilibrium interest rates because
of moral hazard and adverse selection. Moreover, four years before the
publication of the renowned article by Stiglitz and Weiss, Joseph Jadlow
(1977) successfully modeled as an externalities problem the analysis that
leads Smith to support usury laws.
The problem with this modern line of modeling Smith is that, independent of which model is used, the policy conclusions (of both StiglitzWeiss and Jadlow) are diametrically opposed to Smith’s. While Smith
concludes that there is a positive role for usury laws, the modern analyses lead us to consider usury laws as unnecessary.
Let us go back to Stiglitz and Weiss’s analysis, at the base of which
there is a market with imperfect information. Not surprisingly, Stiglitz
and Weiss consider the problem of imperfect information in a principalagent framework, where the problem of gathering all the information
is a monitoring cost.20 Stiglitz and Weiss, as modern economists, use
modern tools, that is, they assume strict rationality that leads to “perfect” maximization. Stiglitz and Weiss proposed usury laws in the speciﬁc case in which the interest rate would be too low to ﬁnance a safe
project, so that banks would pick a higher interest rate that would instead encourage riskier projects. But in normal conditions there is no
need for usury laws, because the proﬁt-maximizing bank would never
ask usury rates. If Stiglitz and Weiss are correct, their analysis presents
two opportunities to reconcile Smith’s dilemma. If, in practice, the market interest rate would always be “too low,” the bank would be led to
pick the too high “risky” rate, therefore making usury laws optimal. Or,

20. The nature of the problem is important. Monitoring costs are costs related to vision,
the fact that we simply cannot see with our own eyes everything relevant that is occurring. In
Smith’s framework, the ability to see (literally and ﬁguratively) is generally biased, leading to
systematic errors. See also Berkeley’s “New Theory of Vision” in Berkeley 1975.
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what is perceived as the maximizing interest rate in reality is not, opening again the door to usury laws.
George Stigler (1988) understood that Smith’s answer was the second one; he saw one of the different analytical tools that Smith used,
but did not accept it. Smith built his system starting from observing human behavior and human errors. Stigler started from the assumption that
systematic error was impossible. Stigler accused Smith of considering
lenders as “foolishly shortsighted.” Smith started from the observation
that systematic error existed. For Smith, lenders are in fact shortsighted.
But being shortsighted does not mean being “foolishly” so. Adam Smith,
as a classical moral philosopher, uses ancient tools, that is, he observes
“irrational” misperceptions that lead to gross mistakes.
The difference in the possibility of systematic perception error is important. It is this difference that makes many modern economists unable to rationally explain gambling or voting. Not surprisingly, Smith
has no problem explaining these “irrational” behaviors (voting, actually,
was not explained because it was not an issue in his time). As mentioned above, Smith believes that people have systematic misperceptions. Therefore, Smith is not saying that individuals, in our case gamblers as well as borrowers and lenders, are “irrational,” but that they are
maximizing with “incorrect” data. If Smith’s individual would have had
perfect perception, I believe he would have acted exactly like Stiglitz and
Weiss’s individual, Smith would have reached precisely the same policy
conclusions as Stiglitz and Weiss, and Stigler would have been happier
with Smith.
In Stiglitz and Weiss’s world, human beings perceive perfectly, so
a ceiling will generally be self-imposed by the banks themselves. In
Smith’s world, human beings have biased perceptions, so the ceiling will
not appear spontaneously, but should be legally imposed in order to preserve social harmony.
A Possible Response by Smith to Modern Economists
The ﬁrst modern economist who accused Smith of inconsistency because he favored the free market as he simultaneously favored usury laws
was Jeremy Bentham ([1787] 1952). Bentham, in my reading, recognized one of the two instruments of analysis that Smith used—perception
biases, and the systematic errors that follow—but failed to recognize and
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understand the other—moral philosophy; therefore, his attack against
Smith’s position.
Siding with Bentham, at least as far as his modern positive (amoral)
tools of analysis are concerned, modern literature tries, in vain, to rationalize the relationship (or lack thereof) between Smith and Bentham.
Jacob Viner (1965, 18–19) can be considered as a representative
example:
A friend of Bentham’s, George Wilson, reported to Bentham in a letter
of Dec. 4, 1789, that Smith had in conversation with William Adam,
another friend of Bentham, spoken respectfully of Bentham and of his
argument in The Defense of Usury, and that Smith “seemed to admit
that you were right.” With only this to go on, Rae states that “Bentham won—what is rarer—his [i.e., Smith’s] conversion from the doctrines impugned.” Professor W. Stark has recently published the draft
of a letter of Bentham to Smith written either late in 1789 or early
in 1790, in which Bentham reports that he has heard of an apparent
acceptance by Smith of Bentham’s position, and asks for permission
to make public Smith’s conversion to Bentham’s position. Smith died
on July 17, 1790. Bentham received no reply to his letter, but there
reached him at the same time as news of Smith’s death “a present”
from Smith in the form, according to Stark, of a presentation copy
of The Wealth of Nations. [At this point is a footnote: See W. Stark,
Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings, London, 1952, I, 26–27, 189–
190. It seems more likely that it was either a copy of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments only, or copies of both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, which Smith sent to Bentham
in 1790. A ﬁfth edition of The Wealth of Nations was published in
1789. A sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments was published in 1790, shortly before Smith’s death. Bonar reports that University College, London, has Bentham’s presentation copy of the sixth
edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (A Catalogue of the Library of Adam Smith, 2d ed., London, 1932, Introduction, p. xxxiii,
and pp. 201–203). John Bowring, Bentham’s editor, states that Bentham “received a copy of Smith’s works which had been sent to him
as a token of esteem.” (The Works of Jeremy Bentham, John Bowring
ed., Edinburgh, 1838 ff., III, 52, italics mine.)] From the information
available all that can be safely inferred is that Smith bore Bentham
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no ill-will for his criticism and possibly did not deny that it had some
force.
Smith’s 1790 silence is seen as a possible implicit acceptance of Bentham’s position, notwithstanding that even in the 1789 edition of The
Wealth of Nations, Smith does not change his favorable attitude toward
usury laws. Now, consider that, on his deathbed, Smith asked that all
his unpublished manuscripts be burned, fearing that imprecisions would
lead to misunderstanding of his thoughts (West 1976). But some modern
readers claim that Smith believed that he had erred with respect to usury
laws and that he left that error in place, although he had three years to
correct himself. According to modern analysis, Smith not only was inconsistent in his thought, but reinforced his inconsistency by also acting
inconsistently.
If we instead consider The Theory of Moral Sentiments as the key to
understanding Smith’s consistency, Smith answered Bentham (standing
in for all the future economists who analyze Smith with modern tools) by
sending him the last edition of his two volumes: The Wealth of Nations
is unchanged on the usury laws regardless of many criticisms; read The
Theory of Moral Sentiments to understand why.
Conclusion
Viewing Adam Smith as inconsistent because he promoted the free market and usury laws at the same time can be the result of analyzing his
work with inappropriate instruments. Adam Smith’s view of usury laws
may represent the verbalization and the systematization of centuries of
experience and observation that some modern economists tend to forget. Indeed, inappropriate instruments of analysis leave behind an author’s contextual knowledge and therefore the possibility of fully understanding his work. When, instead, Smith’s contextual knowledge is taken
into account, different interpretative instruments emerge. I propose to
see Smith’s political economy as Smith saw it, namely as a branch of
moral philosophy. If this is the case, two interpretative instruments—
virtue in the form of medietas and systematic perception errors—expose
the original logic of Smith’s work and its consistency: the free market
and legally controlled interest rates are both ways to follow the general moral rule, “in medio stat virtus,” and to maintain an orderly good
society.
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